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Abstract 
In this paper, we try to study the determinants of the banks' capital ratio in an emerging country. To do so, 
we model the relationships between some variables of the banks and this ratio. Our aim is to explain its 
high level. We try also to answer to a new question. Is it affected by the same factors in the emerging 
countries as in the industrialized ones?   
The sample is composed of 18 banks. The data are half yearly. The period sample is from 2002 to 2008.  
We find that the interest margin and the risk affect strongly the capital ratio. They explain the excess of the 
capital held by the Tunisian banks. So, this excess is not explained only by regulatory pressures. The 
deposit variability and the intermediation rate have the same sign. But, the equity cost and the deposits ratio 
both have a negative impact.  The main determinants are the same for all the countries. 
 
Keywords: Capital ratio, commercial bank, capital determinants, capital structure, developing countries.            
 
1. Introduction 
The financial intermediation specificity and the regulation make the commercial banks different from the 
non financial firms.  Marques and Santos (2003) stated that capital regulation is the first external 
determinant of the banks’ capital structure. Many other authors arrived at the same conclusion. This may be 
true in developed countries. But in developing small countries, there are no enough studies that show this 
influence.  If the Basel rules are imposed on the commercial banks over the world, their influences must 
be the same, whatever the size of the banks. Consequently, only one theoretical approach must be observed 
in the banking industry.   
The Commercial banks hold capital because they are required to do so by authorities. Nevertheless, the 
capital level is determined by the bank   requirements, by the risk and by the capital cost. With high 
equity cost, bank managers try to hold the minimum capital required. However, if the risk taken is high they 
must increase the capital. 
Schaeck and Čihák (2007) stated that if banks operate in a competitive environment, they tend to hold a 
higher capital ratio.  This is consistent with the idea that if an economy is bank-based, the competition 
degree in the capital markets is week. This may be the case of the Tunisian banking market.  
Murinde and Yaseen (2004) found that the capital requirements affect commercial banks’ capital decisions 
in the MENA region. They said that regulatory pressure did not induce banks to increase their capital.  
Brewer et al. (2008) demonstrated that if the banking sector is relatively small, the banks maintain a higher 
capital adequacy ratio. When the authorities practice prompts corrective actions, this ratio is high too. 
The capital structure of small banks operating in a local market has not been enough investigated. So, we 
will try to analyze empirically the validity of the banks’ capital theory in an emerging country. This will 
allow us to test the universality of the rules and the relationships demonstrated by the previous studies.        
We will analyze those relationships in the Tunisian commercial banks by applying a linear model. We insert 
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two new variables not tested in previous empirical studies: The deposit variability and the intermediation 
rate which represent the banking activity. Rapid deposits variability characterizes the Tunisian banks. It 
may directly affect their capital ratio.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will present the Tunisian banking characteristics. 
The third section is devoted to the literature of capital structure in commercial banks.  In the fourth section, 
we will analyze empirically the determinants of capital ratio in Tunisian banks. The main results are drawn 
in the fifth section. The conclusion constitutes the sixth section.  
 
2. Tunisian Banking Characteristics 
The Tunisian banking industry is small.  In 2010, there are 30 small domestic commercial banks. They are 
based in Tunis and big towns. The three first largest banks are state owned. It is characterized by its high 
degree of concentration. In fact, the public banks hold more than half of total market share.  In this case, 
the authorities can easily influence their strategies and their decisions. As displayed in Table 1, large public 
banks hold often less capital than the private ones. After the reforms, the Tunisian banks have adopted a 
new governance system. It is the same as those of European banks. They are well managed and well 
organized. 
Tunisia’s banks are actively involved with European banks. In addition to financial flows, some foreign 
banks have shares in the capital of Tunisian banks. 
Capital requirements in Tunisia have been dictated by Basel I. Basel I rules had started to be applied in 
1992. It was 5% of risk weighted assets, and then it rose to 8% in 1999. The recorded rates were between 
8.4% and 13.4%. They were so high. 
During the sample period, the annual capital ratio was as shown in Table 1. 
For small as for large banks, the capital ratio was often higher than that required one. As noted by Berger et 
al. (2008), the excess of equity makes it difficult to any analyst to tell how banks manage their capital. For 
Tunisian banks, the problem of adjustment did not arise.  This is due to the banks' policies. They adopted 
risky loan strategies, and they increased their equity to escape the regulator pressures.   
Table 1 shows that since 2004, the private banks’ ratio is higher than that of public banks. This can be 
explained by the large size of the stated owned banks. Their size had notably increased after their mergers 
with the development banks. Moreover, they are often sustained by the authorities. 
It is noted that during the same period, Trier 1 was higher than the minimum imposed by Basel I.  
The notable increase of the capital ratio is due to the 2001 law. All the Tunisian banks increased their 
capital by issuing of new shares. During the last decade, their average ROE was 13%. Their rate of 
earnings' retention was high. This had led to an increase in equity.     
As it has been pointed out above, the Tunisian banks adopt new methods of management, and they apply 
the international prudential rules. However, they are not as large and powerful as the American or the 
European banks.  Compared to those banks, Tunisian banks are too small. Their total asset is equal or 
lower than these of a single bank in a developed country. In Tunisia, the banking sector is small. It has 
some characteristics: the number of banks is very limited, the dominant banks are public and the 
concentration degree is high. With these specificities, the Tunisian banks may differ from those of other 
countries. 
These specificities lead us to ask several questions: If the banks’ capital ratios were often high, why did the 
authorities impose the Basel ratio? Does the level of equity constitute a result of other factors specific to 
Tunisian banks? Are the determinants of capital ratio the same in emerging countries as in developed ones? 
The capital structure of small banks operating in a local market has not been enough investigated. So, we 
will try to analyze empirically the validity of the banks’ capital theory in an emerging country. This will 
allow us to test the universality of the rules and the relationships demonstrated by the previous studies.        
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3. Banks’ Capital Structure 
3.1 Theoretical Fundamentals 
For the firms, two main alternative theories are identified for their capital structure: the Trade-off and the 
Pecking Order. The first holds that the capital structure is determined by the trade off between the benefits 
and the debts ' costs. The second holds that the short run costs exceed the benefits of adjusting the capital 
structure. Thus, firms rely first on retained earnings and then on the debts. They issue stocks only if the 
marginal costs of the additional debts exceed the costs of this new issuing. The commercial banks prefer 
first the retained earnings. The pecking order theory suggests that the dividend provides a good signal about 
the future prospects of the firm. So, the managers will issue new equity as there is less information 
asymmetry in the capital market. 
For the banks, the subjects relating to the problems of the liquidity creation and the loan risk were 
considered a priority for a long time.   The capital structure of the banks has not been considered as an 
important topic.  Marques and Santos (2003) considered that the studies on the bank's capital are very 
limited. In fact, the issue has not been treated for long years. There are two reasons to think that the capital 
ratio does not deserve to be studied. The first is the absence of limits for the deposits. The second is the 
ease of the access to the capital market. 
Baltensperger (1973) stated that the banks maximize their profit when the mix liabilities equity is optimal. 
Then, they have to hold an appropriate capital ratio. In this case, their deposits and their loan ratios are 
optimal too.  
Kohen and Santomero (1980) demonstrated that a regulation based only on the “equity /assets” ratio cannot 
necessarily lead to the expected results. They proposed a ratio with weighted risk assets. They cited other 
determinants: The deposit growth, the asset size and the revenue.     
For Brewer et al. (2008), under regulation, the capital ratio may be determined by one or other of these 
theories. The trade-off assumptions with binding regulation have a testable prediction. In instance, if there 
is only one ratio, banks should operate above the required minimum. The Pecking order hypothesis assigns 
a significant role to the government rules. 
With nonbinding regulation hypotheses, the both theories have the same results.   They retain that the 
market forces have an important role. In fact, they determine the cushion banks seek to maintain their 
capital over the minimum. 
Gropp and Heider (2007) found that the determinants of the capital of the firms are also significant for the 
banks. 
 
3.2 Banking Capital Theory After Basel I 
After the application of the Basel I rules, the issue of the capital ratio attracted the researchers in developed 
countries. In the last two decades, several studies are carried out. Their aim is to explain the relationships 
between this ratio and some internal and external variables. 
Berger et al. (1995) stated that the theory of capital structure of the firms cannot be fully applied to the 
financial institutions. This is due to the regulation. They also pointed to the importance of external factors 
that affect the capital of the banks. 
Diamond and Rajan (2000), affirmed that the high capital reduces the creation of liquidity by the bank. But 
it enables them to be solid and to avoid the bankruptcy. 
Why do commercial banks hold often more capital than the minimum required?  Does it mean that their 
economic capital is determined by the intermediation volume? Or it is determined by their risk level? 
For Alfon et al. (2005), the capital adequacy is a positive signalling for the market and for all the partners to 
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modify their perceptions.  Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) pointed out that when economic growth is high, the 
banks make more profit.  This profit may contribute to their capital increase. So, they hold more capital. 
These authors stated that with the Basel I accord, the notion of capital used in the approach of risk based 
capital could not adequately explain the bank’s capacity to compensate the losses. They also pointed out 
that the risk criteria that they employed were not satisfactory. Certainly, the managers of the commercial 
banks realized this reality. To guard themselves against the risks, they take care that the capital ratio is high.   
Gropp and Heider (2007) found that the profitable banks tend to have relatively more equity. Their findings 
are consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory.   
Kleff and Weber (2008) demonstrated that the capital level is positively correlated with the profit. The 
accumulation of the profit breeds the capital growth.   
Brewer et al. (2008) pointed out that for the banks, the use of the equity should be determined by the same 
set of forces that influence other firms. But the combined impacts of the government safety net policies and 
the regulation must be taken in account.    
The findings of Ahmad et al. (2009) for Malaysian banks are inconsistent with the previous results. They 
demonstrated that the earnings affect negatively the capital ratio. For them, these findings contradict the 
view that a high ratio (earnings/franchise value) provides the managers an easy access to equity. High 
earnings may cause bank management to reduce capital cushioning accordingly.  
Most of the previous studies demonstrated that the regulation is not the unique determinant of the capital 
ratio. There are many other macroeconomic and banks’ specific Determinants.   They are rather numerous 
and they have a power in explaining the variation of this ratio. 
Further the regulation, the main determinants are: The profitability, the capital cost, the risk, the deposits 
and the asset size.  
 
4. Empirical analysis of the Tunisian banking industry 
4.1 Sample and Data 
We employed half-yearly data from the Tunisian banking industry for the period January 2002-December 
2008. The data are obtained from financial statements published by banks and from quarterly and annual 
reports of central bank of Tunisia. This period was selected to observe the determinants of the bank capital 
ratios after the 2001 reform.  Many banks have increased their capital after this reform. There were many 
mergers and, during this period, strange commercial banks became shareholders in Tunisian banks.  
This factor makes it difficult to adjust the previous data to make them comparable to the data collected after 
2001. For all relating variables to be used in our regressions, each bank must have data for seven years. 
In addition, we excluded two banks recently created, the development banks and all other development 
banks recently transformed into deposit banks.  After this selection, our final sample contains 18 
commercial banks. 
For empirical regression, the equity cost is annual because the dividend is annual. We consider that for the 
first half year, the cost of equity is the same as that of the second period of the previous year. The cost for 
the second half year is determined for the same year. With this temporal shift, each cost will be used twice 
times, but in two different years.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics for the independent variables. 
The means of the variables are presented in Table 2 by six months. The banks of our sample have an 
average of capital ratio of 11.37%.  
The Risk was very high although its decrease from 18.6% in the first half of 2002, to 16.4% in the second 
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half of 2008. The Tunisian commercial banks finance more and more the risky activities.  For the sample 
period, its average is 17.3%.  
The equity cost decreased over time from 12.8% in 2002 to 9.51% in the second half of 2008. This is due to 
the increase more than proportional of equity compared to the dividend.  
The mean of the ratio “term deposits/demand deposits” is around 55% and it has increased since 2002.  In 
2008, it is around 65%. The stability of the deposits improved, but their average cost increased. The interest 
margin rate recorded small semi-annual increases and its average is around 8.73% during the sample 
period.  
The intermediation rate has improved for all the banks, essentially for the large banks. Its average is 74%.    
The size of the assets of the banks of our sample has increased over the period 2002 - 2008.   
Demand deposit variability has increased with constant rhythms. This means that the share of the deposits 
in liabilities has dropped. It was 48.23% in the first half of 2002 and it increased to 63.74% in 2008, for all 
the commercial banks. Its average is 57.67%. 
The average capital ratio of the banks has been higher than the minimum required over time. It was around 
10.6% in 2002 and around 11.2% at the end of 2008. Its mean is around 10.93%. 
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix of the variables of the model. It shows that three variables are 
negatively correlated with capital ratio. They are the deposit ratio, the equity cost and the asset size. The 
negative sign of the variable size means that the larger banks have lower capital ratio.  All the other 
variables are positively correlated with the capital. 
 
4.3 The Model 
The general empirical regression is specified as follows: 
                    Yit   = λ0   + Σ λj Xjit    +    εit                             (1) 
Where,       
Yit is the capital ratio in time t for the bank i 
λ0 is  a constant 
Xjit is the jth explanatory variable for the ith bank in period t 
λj is the parameter to estimate 
εit is  the error term 
 
4.3.1 Empirical Specification and Methodology 
          Our model helps to determinate the capital ratio of bank i at time t. We will use the standard 
capital determinants as explanatory variables. Market value is used only for equity. The equity cost is 
approximated by the ratio “dividend/equity”.  The deposit ratio measures the structure of the deposits.  
To allow a better comparison, the assets must be adjusted by the consumer price index. 
We exclude the external economic variables. They may be correlated with the bank specific factors. The 
variable regulation is excluded too. Its elimination is justified by the very high capital ratios during the 
sample period. This will allow us to highlight the effects of the banks’ specific variables. 
We propose two new bank specific variables:  The intermediation rate and the deposit variability. 
 
4.3.1.1 Deposit Variability 
The variability of demand deposits has an impact on the liquidity of the banks and on their insolvency risk. 
A high variability may be a synonym of the weakness of the financial resources.  It is the case when the 
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proportion of the term deposits is low.  If this situation is accompanied with a rather great loans portfolio, 
the banks would be obliged to increase their capital.  
This variable can be approximated by the ratio “outflows of deposits/inflows of deposits” of the period. 
When outflows are higher than inflows, the variability is speedy.    
The analysis of the deposits’ movements of all the banks shows that for the households and the small savers, 
it increases remarkably in summer and during the month of Ramadan and at the end of the year. For all 
banks’ customers, this variability is cyclical. It has an influence on the structure of loans.  Indeed, the 
faster is this variability, the more the banks grant short-term credits.   
More there are cheaper deposits, more intermediation brings back profits. But when the share of deposit 
decreases, the banks will borrow at a higher cost. This decrease can be compensated by debts and by 
additional equity. 
In our model, we retain the average of the ratios recorded for each six month period. It is expected that it 
influences negatively the capital ratio.  
 
4.3.1.2 Intermediation Rate 
This variable is determined by the ratio “Total loans / total deposits". It represents the volume of activity of 
the banks.  The more this rate is high, the more the bank are efficient, and the more it is able to profit from 
economies of scale.  
A high intermediation rate means that the bank grants more loans. Its liquidity risk and its loans losses may 
be high. We expect that this rate influences positively the capital ratio. 
 
4.3.1.3 Panel equation 
It is written as follows: 
Capitalit =   λ0 + 1 RISKit + 2 IMRit + λ3 COEQit 4 DEPVARit + λ5 INTRATit 
                  + 6 DEPRi,t  +  7 AVCPt  + λ8  ln ASSZi,t   +  εit                    
(2) 
Where,  
Capital:  The capital ratio for bank i at period t. 
RISK:  The ratio “loans loss reserve/loans” for bank i at time t. 
IMR:  Interest margin rate is the ratio inflation-adjusted “net interest margin / Asset” for bank i at period t.   
COEQ:   Cost of equity for bank i at period t. 
DEPVAR:  The demand deposits variability approximated by the ratio “deposits inflows/deposits 
outflows” for bank i at period t. 
INTRAT: Intermediation rate for bank i at period t measured by the ratio “loans/ deposits”. 
DEPR: Is the ratio “term deposit/ demand deposit” for bank i at time t. 
AVCP:  The average capital adequacy ratio of all the banks of the sample at period t. 
ASSZ:  The size of the bank measured by total assets adjusted by the consumer price index. It is the 
natural log of total assets. 
εit : The error term. 
 
4.3.4 Multicollinearity Test 
To detect multicollinearity, we determinate the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the independent variable. 
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The VIF measures how much the variance of a coefficient (square of the standard deviation) is increased 
because of collinearity. 
R-squared and VIF of our model’s independent variables are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that none of the R-squared are near to 1.0. The variance of inflation factor (VIF) is always 
less than 5. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Results Significance 
Table 6 reports the regression results. We employ the Hausman specification to test whether the individual 
random effects are correlated with explanatory variables or not. The Breussch-Pagan Lagragian multiplier 
is used to test the significance of random effect in the model. It is also used to test the validity of the 
exogeneity of the explanatory variables.    
The null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the unobserved individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variable. For our study, the within estimator is the best to perform.  
According to Baltagi (1995), the random effects model FGLS estimates the error variance–covariance 
matrix. It assumes that the errors follow a panel specific autoregressive process. In the same time, the 
variance of the error is allowed to be different across units. He pointed out that the fixed effects model is 
appropriate when focusing on a specific set of N firms and when the inference is restricted to their behavior. 
In our study, this model is performed to make comparisons with previous studies. Both models will be run 
using feasible general least squares (FLGS) estimators. 
It is worth noting that the signs of the coefficients are similar for all the regressions. In fact, we see that in 
the columns (1) (2) and (3), most of the coefficients magnitudes have not changed significantly. 
The Table 6 shows that only three variables are negatively correlated with the dependent variable: The 
deposits ratio, the equity cost and the asset size. All the other variables are positively correlated with the 
capital ratio.  
With the p-values significance of all the explanatory variables, we estimate that our model is a reliable. 
The variance analysis shows that there is a strong relationship between all the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable. 
 
5.2 Relationships’ Signs 
The Asset size has a negative sign.  So, it influences capital in the opposite direction. As it is shown in the 
Table 6, this variable might have an important impact on the equity level. This result is explained by the 
great increase of the total assets of all the Tunisian banks since 2002. The average rate of this increase is 
higher than that of the capital.   
Our result is in accordance with those found by Alfon et al. (2005), Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) and Gropp 
and Heider (2007). For Tunisian banks, this can be explained by the fact that the large banks have more 
depositors. The public banks have a lower ratio, because they have easy access to the financial market. 
The sign of the deposits ratio coefficient is negative. A high deposits ratio means that the banks have more 
stable resources. Consequently, the share of all the deposits in the liabilities is high too.  However, when 
the deposit ratios are high, the banks have costly deposits. But this cost remains lower than the cost of all 
the other funds. Therefore, the capital may relatively decrease. 
According to the results of our regression, the banks that take higher risks have a higher capital ratio.  
They need to hold more capital to provide a buffer against losses. It is the same result as those of Rime 
(2001), Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) and Gropp and Heider (2007).  The coefficient of the variable “Risk” 
is the smallest. That means that risk influences the capital ratio less than the other variables. 
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The coefficients of the equity cost are high. As Alfon et al. (2005), we find that it has a negative impact on 
capital. The Tunisian banks yearly pay a relatively important dividend. In this case, banks may be 
encouraged to have more loans because of the high equity cost. 
Table 6 shows that the interest margin rate is significant at the 0.05 level in explaining the capital ratio.   
In our regression, its coefficients are positive and higher than all the other coefficients. Thus, earnings and 
capital are strongly related. The profitability is the first determinant of capital structure in Tunisian banks. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), and Kuo and Lee (2003) found the same strong relationship.  
There may be two way causalities between the equity cost and the interest margin rate in one hand, and the 
dependant variable in another one. Indeed, a higher profitability can infer an increase of the equity cost. In 
this case, the stockholders may require an increase of their dividends. The managers must determine the 
optimal retained earnings in order to increase capital to the desired level. This result shows that the Pecking 
order theory seems to be verified in the Tunisian banks. 
We notice that the signs of the deposit ratio and the demand deposit variability are opposite. Table 6 shows 
that deposit variability has more influence on capital level.  The deposit ratio has improved, but it has not 
compensated the increase of the demand deposits variability.  This explains why the capital ratio has 
increased during the sample period.  
The intermediation rate is significant at the 0.05 level.  It influences positively the capital ratio. Its 
coefficient is high. This is due to the increase of the volume of   activity. This evolution leads to higher 
risks and best profits. With These improvements, the equity might increase. 
The sector average ratio is significant at the 0.01 level.  A high average ratio may influence managers in 
increasing the capital. Each bank tries to have a ratio capital near or equal to the average. Its aim is to send 
a positive signal to the market and to the authorities. For commercial banks, there are self incentives to 
raise their capital. They seek to avoid the successive interferences by the central bank.     
 
6. Conclusion 
This study extends those carried out for the bank's capital ratio in the developed countries.  We tried to 
explain the relationships between the capital ratio and the bank's variables. The proposed model has eight 
variables. 
All our findings are in line with those of the p studies curried out in the industrial countries. Therefore, the 
relations developed in theory in the developed countries are also observed in the emerging ones. 
The risk and the revenue have a positive impact on the dependent variable. They are significant in 
explaining the bank’s capital excess.  This excess is not due only to regulatory pressures. 
The improvement of the intermediation rate and the asset size leads to a higher ratio.  All the banks adjust 
it to make it close to the average. So, their capital increases. 
The increase in the cost of equity reduces the capital. The deposit variability and the ratio of deposits have a 
negative effect on the capital.  
The annual rates of the funds increase give us an idea on the financing order. The banks rely firstly on the 
deposits.  Then, they raise their equity and finally, they make use of debts. This order is justified by the 
costs of the funds and by the high ROE. Thus, a specific Pecking Order seems to be verified in the Tunisian 
banks. 
During the last decade, the rate of growth was high. All the banks had to finance the investments. So, their 
loans and their risk increased. This explains why their capital ratios were high. 
If we take to account the economic conditions, the results might change. The bank's index of the 
management efficiency may affect the equity level. It is a new research question. 
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       Table 1: Tunisian banks’ Capital ratio (%) 
Ratios 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Banking industry capital ratio 9.6 9.3 11.6 12.4 11.3 11.0 11.2 
Private banks capital ratio 8.9 8.4 12.4 13.4 12.1 11.5 11.8 
Public banks capital ratio 10.2 10.8 10.1 10.0 9.3 10.0 10.3 
         Source: Central bank of Tunisia and APB annual reports. 
 
       Table 2(a): Half annual means of variables 
Variables 2002-1 2002-2     2003-1    2003-2      2004-1     2004-2    2005-1  
Capital ratio 9.73   9.89       10.37 10.76 11.08 11.32 11.54 
Risk 18.60 18.50    18.20 18.40 18.30 18.50 18.10 
Net margin interest    8.24 8.32 8.49 8.64 8.71 8.63 8.85 
Equity cost     12.41 11.12 11.12 11.05 11.05 10.83 10.83 
Ratio of deposits      48.23 48.58 49.86 50.16 51.79 52.34 54.42 
Deposit variability    52.11 53.23 53.16 54.37 55.24 56.48 57.64 
Intermediation rate    65.32 65.92 67.69 68.08 68.49 70.83 71.26 
Ratio of the Sector   10.62 10.87 11.39 10.74 11.36 13.71 12.58 
Asset size          13.82 13.34      14.53 14.61 15.08 14.70 15.24 
                                   
       Table 2(b): Half annual means of variables  
Variables 2005-2    2006-1 2006-2 2007-1 2007-2 2008-1 2008-2 
Capital ratio 11.59 11.42   12.54 12.73     12.68     11.67 11.91   
Risk 17.80 17.70 17.20 16.90 17.10 16.70 16.40 
Net margin interest    8.93 8.86 9.07 8.98 9.12 9.21 9.38 
Equity cost     10.31 10.31 9.96 9.96 9.78 9.78 9.51 
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Ratio of deposits      56.12 55.09 55.94 61.60 62.89 63.47 64.54 
Deposit variability    58.90 59.31 59.56 60.27 60.86 62.59 63.74 
Intermediation rate    72.14 72.76 72.88 72.44 73.57 74.71 75.62 
Ratio of the Sector   11.01 11.68 11.85 10.47 9.83 11.27 11.18 
Asset size          15.67 15.88    15.69   15.93   16.05   16.42    16.46      
RISK:  the ratio “bank provision/loans”  
IMR:     interest margin rate is the ratio inflation-adjusted “interest margin / Assets”.   
COEQ:   Cost of equity approximated by “Dividend/market value equity” 
DEPVAR:   the demand deposits variability approximated by the ratio “outflows of deposits 
/inflows”  
INTRAT: intermediation rate approximated by the ratio “loans /deposits” 
DEPR: is the ratio “term deposit/ demand deposit”  
AVCP:  the average capital adequacy ratio of all the banks of the sample,  
       ASSZ:  the size of assets adjusted by the consumer price index. It is the natural log of total 
assets. 
 
  Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Means Std Dev  Min Max 
Capital ratio 11.3764 2.8943 8.64 12.98 
Risk 17.3634 11.0164 38.73 72.47 
Net margin interest 8.8164 3.6178 7.84 12.34 
Equity cost 9.4437 2.9452 8.41 10.83 
Ratio of deposits 55.4314 16.2687 39.23 72.38 
Deposit variability 57.6715 17.2657 48.23 63.74 
Intermediation rate 74.1664 14.5254 67.68 93.26 
Ratio of the Sector 10.9362 2.3173 10.80 11.90 
Asset size 15.6428 5.6128 13.34 16.46 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix for dependent and explanatory variables 
              Capital ratio   Risk   IMR    COEQ   DPER    DEPVAR   INTRAT   ASEZ   
AVCP 
Capital ratio       1       
Risk            0.4474      1 
IMR            0.5464    0.4326      1 
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COEQ         -0.2548    0.1496   0.0986       1 
DPER         -0.1897    0.0687   0.2876    -0.1879     1 
DEPVAR      0.2167    0.1092   -0.0832    0.1427  -0.0169      1 
INTRAT       0.2452    0.0957   -0.2417   -0.2417   0.1528   -0.8246       1 
ASEZ         -0.0742    0.0508   0.0529    -0.0537   0.0884   -0.0031    -0.0568      1 
AVCP  0.0937   -0.3112    0.0713   -0.1818   0.0233   -0.0697    0.0286    -0.0162       1 
  
                Table 5: Multicollinearity Test 
Variables R-squared VIF 
Risk 
Net margin interest 
Equity cost 
Ratio of deposits 
Deposit variability 
Intermediation rate 
Ratio of the Sector 
Asset size 
0.195247 
  0.426832 
0.119425 
0.315139 
0.438634 
 0.463956 
   0.528914 
   0.628545 
1.242617299 
1.744689166 
  1.135621608 
 1.460150307 
  1.781369017 
  1.865518502 
  2.122754465 
  2.692116137 
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Table 6: Regression results 
Explanatory  variables 
Regression model 
Fixed effects (within) Fixed effects(FGLS) Random effects (FGLS) 
Constant 20.4568 (7.5249) ***   9.4685 (3.9246) *   8.8533 (3.7654) *** 
Risk   0.0842 (0.0157) *   0.0598 (0.0107) **   0.0748 (0.0144) ** 
Net margin interest 0.2758 (0.1856) **     0.1985 (0.1036) **   0.2151 (0.1462) *** 
Equity cost   -0.1742  (0.1286) **  -0.1637 (0.0787) ***  -0.1389 (0.4673) *** 
Ratio of deposits -0.0819 (0.0294) *** -0.1048 (0.0384) ***  -0.0962 (0.0216) ***  
Deposit variability 0.1335 (0.05179) *      0.1537 (0.4642) 
*** 
  0.1623 (0.6174) ***  
Interrmediation rate 0.1172(0.0567)**      0.1242(0.0587)*   0.1058(0.0463)** 
Ratio of the Sector  0.0986 (0.0465) *** 0.1179 (0.0409) ***   0.0914 (0.0319) *** 
Asset size   -0.1442 (0.0856) **     -0.1318 (0.0964) **  -0.1121 (0.0886) ** 
Wald chi 2     1742.38       537.92 
R- Squared 0.6724       0.6229  
Within 0.7427       0.6927  
Between overall 0.7182         0.7463 
F-test (p-value)  0            0 0 
Nb observation  80          80  
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level. 
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